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Uften a yuality improvemcnl necessitates modilications of varietal product tèatures. "I'his
paper studies firms' incentivcs tu providc yuality when this decision aliècts the goods' dcgree
of' horizontal ditferentiation. Intuitively, one is inclined to argue that private incentives to
provide quality :tre insuf~ficicnt relative to the social optimum it~ a yuality improvement
reduces horizontal diffèrentiatiun. Wc lind that this argument depends on whether the game is
simultaneous or seyuential. In the former case privatc incentives turn out to be excessive
relative to the social optimum, in thc latter case insufiicient. As a result a regulator might
either want to imposc minimum or maximum yuality standards.
JEL ('IussiJiccdiun: D21, L15.
Kcywords: compctitivc positioning, qualiry standards, multi-dimcnsional product
ditlerentiation.
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applies.1. INTRODUCTION
Improving the quality of onc's product ottcn ncccssitatcs moditications uf othcr product
fcatures. "1'hc inccnlivc lu providc yualily may Ihcrrliirc Jrprnd on how thr goud~~ rntire
position in the characteristics space is aftècted. I'he purpose of this paper is to stud~ this
interaction in a simple model where quality impruvcments strengthcn or weaken the products
varietal differentiation with respect to a competing good. Flow ducs this link affect tirms'
incentives to provide yuality? In the course of our analysis we identify circumstances ~~here
unregulated markets may not ollèr a satisfaclury yualíty Icvel such that minimum yuality
standards are called litt. l3etixe we get precise on that, Ict us motivate uur anal~sis a little
further and illustratc the interaction this paper is about.
First, considcr cars. A better gas mileagc is undoubtedly a yuality tèature of a car since less
consumption reduccs operational costs tiir the consumcrs. (hic way of achieving a lo.ver gas
consumplion is by making thc car morc acrodynamic. I tuwevcr, windtunncl tcsts shov, that
only certain shapes guarantee helter aerodynamics. f Icnce, unc would expect that the shapes
ofcars with lower gas consumptiun become mure and mure similar. l he diffcrences in design
will be Iess pronounced. 't'heretiire, an incrcase in thc yuality ufcars via better aerudynamics
reduces lhe variety uffered in the markcL We say that in this casc yualit}' and varict~ interact
negatively.
L3anking produets are a second example. 'I'he characteristics of heuiking products are otten
negatively correlatcd. Matutes and fadilla (1994) discuss shared Al M networks and bankin~
competition. Compatibility of networks is valucd hy depositurs since it tàcilitatcs access to
deposits. 'hhc rcason is that not only nclwork sirc ntaucrs but alsu thc location of thc hank's
proprictary network is a sourcc of diftcrcntiation. In othcr words, signing a compatihility
agreemcnl implics a rcduclion ul~ gcugraphical Jill~rrntiatiun nnuthcr cxumplc a,ncrrnin(;
lhc linancial scctor is phunchanking. I his Icchnolugy incrca,cs yuality and al lhc sanx timc
reduces the importance of transpnrtation costs (l3ouckacrt and Ucgryse (1995), or Degryse
(1996)). "fherefore, hanks cannot txcome vertically dif7èrentiated without affècting hurizontal
ditierentiation in a negative way. n third cxample conccrns thc afler sale scrvice provided hv
tirms. ~hhe latter may be perlbrmed un the tclephone. I his implies that clumsy uscrs locatedfurthcr away t~om the store value phone support more than their clumsy colleagues at a
shortcr distancc. As a result compatibility uf nctworks, phoncbanking, and aftcr salc scrvicc
ncgutivcly al'Iccl lhc dcgrcc ul'hurizunlal Jil7crcntialiun.
fourth, advcrtising expenditure is oftcn modeled as a yuality feature (sce, o.g., C:conomidcs
( I')R9) or tichulz and tilahl ( 19~)4)). I luwcvcr, lhc cxlcnl lo which advcrlising aliccls lhc
consumers' willingness to pay may depend on their preferences. D'souza and Raós(1995)
tindings arc in support of this. 'I'hcy state that thc effèct of repeatcJ advertising un thc
individual choicc probabilitics intcracts posilivcly with prior prefcrcnccs. In a stutic contcxt of
our analysis, this comes close to saying that advcrtising may have a stronger impact on thosc
consumers feeling'closer' to the brand than on those feeling'lurther away'. "fhus, yuality-like
effects via advertising may be positivcly corrclated with 'proximity.'
These examples show that the assumption of indcpcndent attributes may iniced kx restrictive.
This paper tbcus~s explicitly on the inleraction ol'dependent attributes. In particular, we arc
interested in the yucstion of how lirms' incentives to invest in yuality change whcn this
decision at7ècts thc degrce of horizontal dit7èrentiation in the markeL Pirst, let us focus on
negative intcraction. l~hc results of our analysis are determined by two liirccs. 'I'hc first is a
demand el7cct. n negativc dependence of a product's yuality and varicty charactrristic
strengthens tirms incentives to provide quality since consumers are mure easily attracted by
quality improvements than by price reductions. 'I'his demand force drives thc results whcn
tirms simultancously choosc yuality and pricc. It Icads to cxcessivc privatc inccntivcs to
provide yuality in the presence of ncgative characteristic dependence. 'fhe second lórce is
strategic. Thus it plays only a role if firms can commit to a yuality level before competing in
price. We show that in this setting a negative correlation renders price competition along thc
horizontal characteristic licrcer, thus stimulates underinvestment in yuality. Privatc incentives
to providc yuality arc dampened whcn a yuality incrcasc wcakcns lhc product's varictal
diffcrentiation. In thc scyucntial gamc 'first yuality thcn pricc' wc show that lhc cl7cct of
negativc dcpendcnce on thc strategic cl~lect morc than outwcighs the onc on thc dcnwnd
effect. Conseyuendy, an unregulated markel underprovides yuality such that a minimum
yuality standard is wclfarc improving.Wc alsu analyi.c Ihc casc uf txrsilivc dchcndrncc fur whirh Ihr rrsull, Icntl I„ hc Ihr ulipu.itc.
In parliculur thc modcl recommcnds a muximum yuality standard if an incrcasc in ~luality
sufficiendy decreases competition along the varietal characteristic The reason is that tinns
heavily overinvest in yuality which implics substantial RBcD costs and high transportation
costs fiir the average consumers.
We present these results in a simple duopoly modcl of product innovation in the contezt oY
Jependcnt charactcristics.~ ('Icarly, wc ncrd a modcl r~f at Icast hro-dimcnsional product
differenliation in ordcr lo rcpresent the product-s yu:tlil~ and varirlul characteristics. ~1 ithin
this I~amcwork, therc arc at Ica~l Iwo wavs ul ht,w tmc can jntruducc charactcristic
dependence into lhe picture. t~irst, a product's position in Ihc characteristics space may be
direcUy at7èctcd by thc choice of yuality. 't'his formulation tits thc car example sketched out
abova Givcn that lhcrc is an optimal shapc that minimizcs gas cunswnption, tirms arc tiirced
to approach this shape whcn improving lhe yuality ol thcir product. Second, the yuality
otlèred hy a tirm can dctenninc thc prcfcrencc intcnsity consumcrs attach to its prt~duct.
Phonebanking is u case in point, so is altcr salc scrvice, and advcrtising. 13y ot'ferin~ a hi~her
product yuality via phoncbankint;, hanks rcducc thr imporl;utcr consumrrs altach to
geographical dif7èrentiation of compcting branchcs. In ulhcr wtirds, Ihc yualil~ dreision
aflècts thc transportatiun costs aswciutcd with thc Jimcnsíon of horizontal pruduct
ditlèrentiation. In the following we restrict attention to the second variant of interaction
Fretween the vertical and lhe horiiontal dimension of-product diftèrcntiation.'`
Recently, the product dil'lèrentiatiun lileralurr has tak~n up thr topic ut- lirms~ product
placement decisions in multi-dimensional pruduct spaccs Itirr nndrnon ct. at. (199?1 and the
literature cited therein). t lowever, the empjrjcally relevant ca,c ul altrihutc drprndcnc~ has
not yet lx~en analyred. Our paper presents a simple ~approach to tacklc lhis prohlem. I h~
literature ctosest to our study includes von Ungern-Sternberg (1988), Dos Santos t~crrcira and
Thisse (1996), Gconomides (1989). C'anoy and Peitz (1995), and pegryse (1996). ~I~hc iirst
~ Notice that our modcl uf yuatily provision can tx in[erpreted as a modcl ul deterministic RBcD decisions. In
lwth cases the key fiature is that by incurring a higher tired cost a linn enhances all consumers' marginal
willingness to pay lix its praduct (see alsu Sutton ( 1991 )). I lowever. some specific aspec[s of RKD such as
process innova[ion, spillovers to rivals, imperfect patents, uncerlaínty about success of pr~jects. or the timing of
innuvatíon lie out of the scope uf this paper Por nn uverview on that sce l irole t I~~88).
'` We solved a model cluse to [he car erample. It cuntirms lhe insights and the yuali[ative resul[s cuntained in
section III uf this paper. A version of the'car ecample model' is available upun rcyurst.
4two papers endogenize the determination of the level of transportation costs. Von Ungern-
Sternbcrg intcrprcts this as competition in the degrec of the products' a general purpcix~ncss ~.
He solves liir the simultaneous eyuilibrium in price and transportation cost when lirms arc
equidistantly located on a cirde und incur cosls that are decreasing in the transportation rate.
In cyuilihrium linns uvcrprovidc yualily, i.c., lix tr;inspurlalion cusl tuu luw comparcd to Ihc
social optimum. Our findings for the simultaneuus game with negative interaction confirm
this resulL However, our study suggests that if firms can commit tu a transportation cost Icvel
before competing in prices the private incentive to provide ~~ gcneral purposeness ~i would fall
short of the social optimum. Dos Santos Ferreira and "1'hisse analyze this case where tirms
commit to a transportation cost level before competing in prices. Pirms can increase the
quality of their product by of"fering lower transpnrtation rates, i.c., by providing a hetter
transporlalion tcchnology. "fhc main diftcrcncc lo uur sctup is that wc alluw li~r a yualily
improvement to have two el"fects. It increascs thc willin};ness to pay tiir a product and changes
the transportation rate. "fhis allows us to interpret the transportation rate as an indic;ttor ofthc
toughness of price competition along the horizontal product characteristic.
Economides (19A9) studies yuality variations and maximal variety differentiation. Ile shows
that there is minimal yuality differentiation in cyuilibrium. We obtain a similar result but
unlikc Ecunomidcs, uur analysis cmphasizcs that the levcl uf yuality ol7èred dcpends hcavily
on the interaction between yuality and varicty. Il is worth mentioning Canoy and Pcitr (1995)
who support our conjecture that characteristic depc;ndence is an important phenomenon tiir thc
analysis of market structure. 'fhcy start I~om thc obscrvation that submarkcts for high-yuality
and low-quality variants are markedly different from each other. "fhis is reFlected in their
model where, exogenously given, variants in the low-yuality range are identical fix all
customers whercas lhey strongly disagrce about thc valuc of variants in thc high-yuality
segment. hi other words, they dcal with posilive interaction between yuality and variety for
given product characteristics. In contrast, the present study endogenizes the yuality decision
of tirms taking into account the etlèct of yuality on horizontal differentiation. "fherefore, the
disagreement among customers betwecn variants partly results from the stratcgic behavior of
tirms. Finally, Degrysc (1996) discusscs interaction between horizontal and vertical
differentiation with an application to banking. In his paper, banks làce a discretc choicc
between a high and a low yuality. In addition, hc only considers negative inleractiun. Incontrast, this paper allows lur a cuntinuous yuality choice and incorporates positive
interaction.
~hhis paper is urganir.ed in the ti~llowing way. Sectiun II intruduces the mudel. Section III
studies thc unregulated yuality decision. We discuss a nuncuuprrativc simultaneuus and
seyuential game as well as lhe cuopcrative yuality chuicc. ticction IV cumpares lhrsc rrsults
with thc socially uptimul yuality stanJarJ. ticctiun V cuntains sumc linal remarks.
11. "f'HE MODI?L
In this section, we present a mudel of twu-Jimensional pruduct dilfcrentiation. V1'c consider
iwo firms whosc producls arc vertically and horizuntally dilfèrentiated. Firms compete in
yuality and price. Wc distinguish among thrce diffcrcnt ways of how tirms' decisiuns come
abuut. Pirst, we sludy lhe case where yuali[y and price are simultaneously determined.
Second, we analyz.e thc seyuential choice of both decisiun variables. I~irms play a two-stage
game. nt the lirst stage, thcy dcterminc the yuality of thcir product, at the second stagc they
compete in priccs. ~I'he two stage nature uf the gamc rcllects thc làct that yuality is uHen less
IlexiMe than prices. 'I'hird, we dcal with an RBcD cartcl which at the tirst stap.e detennines
yuality collusivcly bcfbrc compcting in prices. I~hc particularity ol all thcse sccnarios is that
firms' yuality dccision at~fccls thc Jcgrcc ol~horizontul product diflèrentialiun.
I~irms' invcslmenls in product yuality aftcct thc indircct utilih ol~ custum~rs in two ways.
First, a higher yuality is prclcrred by all consumcrs gi~ ing rise tu vertical product
diffèrentiation. Second, depending on the type ol interaction an incrcasc in the yuality Ic~el of
one product may bc higher (lower) valucd by consumcrs with a high preterencc liv iu variety
and Iess by others. More preciscly, cunsidcr two lirms n and f3 located at the endpoints uf~ a
line with Iength une ovcr which cunsumcrs are tmiliirmly distrihuted with density unr. I-:ach
consumcr buys onc item uf cithcr pruduct. I lcr indircct utility uf a purchasc ul brand ,~ is
given by (a similar cxpression holds titr a purchasc of brand 13)i
' Our mudcl encumpasxs uthcr mudcls uf pruducl dillcrcnti.uiun. If ~i 0 uur mudcl bccumcs a spccud r.tx uf
I,conomidcs (19R9). II' in addition wc rcntuvcd Ihc yu:tlit~ vari:tMc I~nnt thc indircct utilih titnctiun. uur ntudcl
were a standard I lutcllin~ ( 19?9) modcl with a Fxr unit transtx~rtntion r:ue eyual to one. It we tuuk disumce awa~
we would obtain a spccial casc ol~ Mussa-Itoscn ( t97R).
(iV-vt.c~ -p~ -( I-~l'.c~)~ whcrc fi 5 ~,
c
and v - gross surplus
s,~ - yuality provided by tirm A
p~ lirm A's pricc
S - intcraction parameter
c - maximum yuality
.. - consumcr location.
The consumer's indirect utility depends on her most preferred variety - which dctermines the
distance to be covered when purchasing brand A ur [3. More importantly, it depends on the
product yuality .~, in two ways. First, rndepemdrnl of the consumer's location an increasc in
yuality augmcnts utility by thc zamc amuunt. ticcond, thc yuality orfèrcd by firn, r
dclermines the prr unit transpurtalion ratc lowards lirm i s producl. 'I'he impact ul~ Ihe laUer
eftèct is clepc~ndr~N un the. inleraclion paramctcr ~i and un lhc cunsumer's lucation. If d' is
positive, an increase in yuality decreases the per unit transportation rate. In this case, we say
that quality and variety are ne~;u[ivcly correlated. E3oth dimensions are said to be po.ciNvely
correlated when fi is negative, and independen~ when S- U."fhe cunsumer location z
determines the marginal indirect utility of quality, i.e. c3V I 8.~~, - I t S: . Hence, under negative
(positivc) correlation, consumcn located far from firm i gain moro (Icss) from a marginal
yualily improvrmcnt. Wc :usumc thal at lixcd priccs nu cunsumcr is wuixc ul7 whcn Ihc
yuality of eilher lirm increases, i.e. c~V I r7.c, -0 fiir all z e~0,1 ~. I~his introduces a lower
bound on thc interaction parameter, i.e. fi?(-I~. When S is zcro, the indirect utility function
becomes separable in yuality and variety. Pinally, S 5 I l.i guarantees that per unit
transportation costs are nonnegative.
C'Icarly, unc could crilicii.r Ihc cho.,cn lirrm ol cunsumcrs' prclcrrnccs un gruunds uf ils
speciticity. Iluwcver, as we show beluw it yields demand functions with very intuitive
propertics. Let cnnsumers compare thcir pretèrence tiir thc hori-tontal characteristic, the
quality level, and the price of both products. l~his trude-off gives rise to a marginal cunsumer
location that determines tirms' demand fLnctions in a standard way. Explicitly, one obtains
7Ve ~P.i. ~ir~..r ,.a'u ~-
I Ittr Prr - P i - I t e'r~ -.~ i~I t 8~
It.x~~-.eu~l Ftl~.tPu-Pr
- Ibrlt.~,~-~~(lrii~-l~ P;-~,;~~~~i~-~;-~ (I)
2 -rl~.r , r e„ Í
11 liir~~a~lt5) ,-I'tl'~~-I'i
I~irm li's JcmanJ is implicitly gic~n as I),; I-1~,. IhmanJs arc lin~ar in huth priccs,
incrcasing in own yuality, and convex Icuncave) il 8 is posilivc (ne~ativc). I he hi~her ri the
lower hecome transpurtatiun costs, thus morc consumers switch hrands in response to price
and yualily changcs, i.c. i, i-.I. e: i- i
ri ~ I), i~ ~ ~),
- ~ 11, ~: 0
r~p,r7r5 ,~~r~r'b
t~' I), ) 1t r~ I) ~,
1I.
t~s,t~d r~e~,r,,d





11, iJ ri 11 .
In lhc li~nncr casc Ihc full cust Iuncliun shilts duwnwarJs anil hccumcs Ilaltrr whrn .1e .0.
I'his implics luwer Uansportation custs, Ihus more price sensilive demands. "f'hr opposite
holds liir ~i . 11.
We assumc pruducliun is such lhat Ihc Icvel ufyuality durs nut aftèrt ~ariahlc custs ~~hich are
normalired lu r.ero. ~ I here is unly a Ii~rJ cust uf rruducing yuulin -i~ en b~ ('~.r, )- c.~; ;'.
hhe yuadratic fiirm of lhc cost tLnction retlects diminishing returns of imcsunent in yuality.
nccordingly, protit functions arc
fl, (p,,~i ..~,.s~1- h,J~,(p,.p,..~~,..c, )-(ys,). i-,1.6.ixj.
a t'hc casc ofyualily Jcpcndcul vari;iblc cutiis iti discutixJ in ticcliun V.
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xlll. THE l1NREGULATF.U QUALITY UECISION
fn this scetion we discuss thc noncooperative and the cooperative choice of price and quality.
First, in Sccliun III.I. wc stuJy Ihc nuncuuprr:divc simullancous and scyucntial p,anirs.
Second, in Section I11.2. we turn to the choicc of an RBcD cariel.
IIL1. NONCOOPERATIVE CHOICF.
IILLL SIMULTANEOUS EQUILIBRIUM: PRICES AND QUALITIES
In this section we study the symmetric simultaneous eyuilibrium in prices and yualilics. Given
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where elp, J ch,l ~~ ,, ~ 0 measures by how much lirm i can push up its price in respunsc to a
marginal incrrasc in yuality whilc kccping its demand constant. Accordinbly, lhc LI IS of (5)
is thc additiunal rr~enuc lhal tinn i obtains I~rom a marginal incrcasc in yuality without
atÏècting its dcmand. In cyuilibrium thc lattcr cyuals thc marginal costs oF providing highcr
yuality. Intuitivcly, changcs in .,, andp, can only bc a dcmand neutral u if thcy Icavc thc
position of the marginal consumer unat7ècted. Ilence, dp, Jd.e,~~ must be eyual to thc
marginal consumer's marginal utility. Proposition I gives the symmetric eyuilibrium resulting
from cvaluation of (5) by using ci - max{0,(I t 2S(2 f S)) J 4} and
c, -1 J4tfi(20f I:kti)I IG.
qNroRositiun 1:
I'hc simultancuus gamc in yualily an(I pricc has a uniyuc symmctric cquilihrium in
pure slralcgics if r? max{c,.c, }. Ihc cyuilibrium yuality is ~" -(? .S), 1a~ )~~hi1e
cyuilihrium priccs arc h" - I-~l.c"
Prool: ticc Appcn(lix.
Prop(tsition I shows lhat lhc simultancuus cyuilihrium pricc and yuality dcpcnd un lhe
intcractiun paramctcr S. Cumparcd to lhc casc ul~ indcpcndcncc Wc tind that s" is II~Wer
(higher) under positivc ( ncgativc) corrclation. In olher words, d.~" ~clfi ~ 0. The intuition is
simple. Higher values ol~ S incrcase the marginal consumer's marginal valuation of a yuality
improvcmcnt which ix cnlircly capturcd by thc lirms.
Prom a C(1nlpafaUVl slatlC analyslti We learn thal thc impact uf (l un Ihc ryuilibrium quality
can be decomposed into two upposing effects. Denote hy tipe~.(~).s..,.c)-o the implicit
function ohtained thruugh cvaluation uf (5) at the symmetric eyuilihrium. I~utal dift~rentiation
of .j(.~ yiclds
1.1
r1C)r ~ r~ ~ U.,
f~i'




('Icarly, it is thr numcralor which dctcrmincs Ihr sign af rl.~" rIS . It tells us hoW thc
marginal rcvenue of an additiunal yuality impruventent reacts to changes in fi.'f~co etlècts
arc at wurk. I~irst. thcrc is a ncputivc pricr rl,ntpctitiun rt~tcct. tiinrr highcr ~alues of c~ make
)xicc rumpclilii,n lirrcrr a yualily intltrrlvrmrnt p;l~s-ull Irs~. ticclmd, thclr i, :t piisilicc
cl7cct ~ ia (trntanil. Nrw cun,unlrrs :ur murr r:l,ih :Ilu~actr(I ~ ia yuality impru~cntrnts whrn
rl' is high. Sincc lhc sccund cll~cl duminatcs lhc lirst. yu:llit~ ;wgments. fhis is tci he
comparcd with thc sccnario uf~scyucntial chuicr.
IIIEquilibrium prices only rellect marginal lransportation costs. 'I'he intuition is that products arc
homogeneous with respect to yuality but maximally JiflerentiateJ with respect to thcir
horizontal characteristic. (1uality has then no Jirect inlluence on the Jetermination uf
eyuilibrium priccs. I lowever, it cntcrs indircctly via the interJelxnJence of [xrih Jimensions
of product diffcrentiation. h~yuilibrium priccs lall with S, i.c.
~~„ r~,~„
~kti - ~~fi




There is a dirrcr :mJ an indireci cllcet uf changes in ~l un the eyuilihrium price Ievcl. "I'he
Jirect clli:ct is part ul lhc pricc cumpctiliun c17i:c1 in (6). 'I ransportaliun cusls lull such Ihat
morc consuntcrs switch brands whcr, prices changc, thus compctition along thc hurir.onlal
chaructcristic intcnsilics. 'I'hc indircct cllcct is positivc sincc thc cyuilibrium yuality incrcascs
as S augmcnts. I'his may rclax pricc comlxaition JcpcnJing un .~i,tn~-~l ~. I hc inJirrct and
Jirccl cflccl havc Ihc samc sign itt thc casc of ncgativc currclaliun. I hc Jirccl cflccl
. oulwcighs lhc indircct cflcct il fxisilivc currclaliun prcvails. nti a resull, thc lulal cllrcl íti
always negativc.
111.1.2. SEQUENTIAL CHOICF,: QUALITY -~ PNICE
I'his srctiun Jcals wilh lhc sululiun ul thc litlluwing twii xlagc gamc. At thc lirst stagc, lirnts
simultaneously Jetermine thc yuality uf thcir products. fhc tirst stage Jccisions becomc
observable beforc tirms compete in prices at the seconJ stage. We are interesteJ in thc
symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Accordingly, we solve for the second stage
price game first. 't'he noncoopcrative solution of the first stage yuality b:vne is presenteJ
al~tcrw:~rds.
11hhc Pricc (:amc
(iiven demands and prutit I'uncljons ut ( I) and (2), standard computations yield the uniyue




"hhree rcmarks arc in order. I~jrst, uhscrvc lhal rricc wmpetitiun txcumcs tuu~hrr as fi
increascs (dp; I dd ~ 11, i- ~, I3) . Lowcr transportation cusls makc consumcrs morr likclv to
switch from onc brand to thc othcr. nccordjngly. Jemand fimctjons brcomc murr pricc
elastjc. Second, unljke standard models ofyualjty chojcr here a yuality improvement of one's
producl docs ntit nccctisarily alluw liir a hi~hcr hricr. In làct, wc havr
r~~i; ( I - rl' )
- ~(lifrl' ~I. i ~ il,[3.
r~.e, 3
Thc rcason is thc liilluwin~. In gcncral an jncrrasc in ~, shilYs lirm i's hcst rcph uut~card.
Ilowcvcr, if 5~ I il alsu cunsjdcrably rrJuccs lhc r~r unjt transrurtation ratr. Ilcncc. hrice
compctition along lhc varidal dimcnsiun bccomcs su intcnse that p, must t~111 in
cyuilibrium.'
"I'hird,
~P, -(I t 2fi )
~7.~., - i
dcscribcs thc chanrc lif lhc rival's rrjcc whrn I~~~n yualil~ incrc;nrc Nuucr Ih;U
~i,~n~r~~~~ I r~.~, ~- si,~n~-(I ~ 2ii )~. I Icncc Ihc rival resliurnls Irtcnilly (;t~t~ressivcl~ 1~~hcn
h ~(~1-0.5. It is lhcn intcresling lu stutly huw lhc inlcracliun i~l charactcrislics u17i'cts
lirmti chojce of yualjty ,tt lhr lirst stagc of thc gamc.
' In tcchnical tcrms, ó I implics an inward shili ul j's bcst repl} íll IlJtil lKlcl :1~ big as thc UUIN'erJ ~hili uf i'ti
Ixst rcpl~.
I?Noncooperative Quality Came
"1'he Jemand function fi~r lirm A at the price eyuilibrium is given by
I fur.e~ -se ?3 -S~2s, t.eu~
lt.c:r~l -h~-.ee~l t2b~
Dn~~.r..~'a~- - fix3-fi~2.e, t.~u~?.~r -.vrr~S~.~.r t2srr~-3
3~2-fi~s, t.~'u~~
0 liirb~.ci }~~n~-3~sr -.~'a
(10)




- A, li; r ~ j
simultaneuu~ly with respcct to lhcir yuality on .~, e~0,.v~, whcrc .cr- ~- if rl' - 11. "I~his IcaJs to
ri
an overall eyuilihrium characterized in Prupusitiun 2. Uetine r:-, - 2l 9 f fi(20 - S) I 3G,
r, -dl27frl(3i3tt3?rl)1432, andc, -max{O,II9tS(20-5)l72} .
Pronosition 2:
I~he seyucntial gamc'lirst yuality then price' has a uniyuc symmclric suhgame pcrl'ccl
eyuilibrium in pure strategies if fix S~(1, r- mar~~„c, ~ and if lix -I 5 S 5 0,
r.~ r ~. 'I hr cyuilihrium yuality is .~ "' - m:rx j(4 -S ) I(12c),O ~ while eyuilibrium prices
;rrr~r" I -rle..
Proof`. See Appendix.
Proposi[ion 2 emphasizes that the noncooperative eyuilibrium yuality and price Icvcl dcpend
crucially on the interaclion parameter rl . Compared to thc indepenJcncc case .e" is highcr
under positive and Iower under negative corrclation, thus d~" I dS ~ Q.
13I'he workings of lhis result can hr txtler understood if unc Jcci~mpi~ses the el~fèct uf a
tnurginal incrcasc in yuality on uwn prulits inlu thc Jircct, lhc slr:ncgic, an~ lhc cust cffrct.
I~ormal ly,
~lll ~~~) ~~l), dp~
~ !', t P, ~1~, ~~.c~ r~li rlc,
I'hc lirtit tcrm im thc RI IS is known as thc Jcmand rflcct. It iz rasily vcrilird thal Ihi~ trrm
cuinciJcs with thc I.I IS uf ( S). It is rusitivc sincc it rcllccls thc mar.inal cunstnncr's marcinal
utility uf a yuality incrc:asc. 'I'hc sccond lcrm rcprescnts lhc stratcgic cl'tcct. It dcscrihcs the
rival's rricc respcrosc tti an incrca.u in own yualitv. It has thc sign determined in (9). Hence
lhe (undcr-) uvcrinvcstment prescripliun dcpcnds on whcthcr i~(~1~-U.~. In thc (ti~rmcr)
lattcrcasc linns ca(~turo ( Icss) ntcxc Ihan thc marginal consumcr's marginal benclit ol~a quality
incrcasc and .e„( .). e~~ (scc I~igurc I liir an illustraliunl.
Ohscrvc lhat yualily is :tn aggrcvsivr variahlc undcr indcpcndcncc. If currclatiun is nc~alive.
i.a ii ~ 0, incrcasing onc's yuality Iriggcrs an cvcn nx,rc a~grrssivr ~ricr reshunsr i~l thc
cumpctitur. 'I'his is in linc wilh inluitiun sincr lhc rival ~,ains nwrc cuntiumcrs liir a gi~en
price change if S is high. "I'hc strategic (underinvestment) ct7cct is then mure pronounced.
lltiing thc lcrtnini~lu~,y ul' I~udcnlxr~, and 'I'in~k ( 19R4), linns hrhavc as hulrpr ~In,Ls thus
gencrating u lowcr cyuilihrium yuality. On thc uther hanJ, if ~l ~ 0 thc incentiw to
undcrinvcst is damrcncd iincc :t highcr yuality rcnders proJucls more hcterogencous. If the
pusitivr corrclatiun is suhslantial thc stratcgic charactcr iif thr rumc switchcs. Unlikr uflen
mudclcJ yuulity can t~ecumc a siifl variublc. I~irnu ovcrinvcsl in yuality thus becomin~ Jui
cu(.c. In all thcsc cauus, thc rnilitahility uf yualily is IimilcJ hy thc cust Iuncti~m ~~hich
cxhihits incrcasing marginal coslti ul'yuulity.
An imrurtanl rctiuh ul' uur ;inalysis is Ih;tl ryuilihrium yualily ~incyuiv~~c;illy I;illti a. ~i
incrcascs. I,ct ,~I.~,ii,cl - U hc lhc imrlicil I'uncti~m rl'tiUlUn~! Irllnl CValUatlUn UI ( I I) ai thc
symmetric eyuilihrium.'futal Jit7crentiati~m resull, in
I~~.~ ~
a~~, } a~o, ~r~, } ao, ~r'~,





It is easily veriticd that the denumínator is negative. ('onsequently, [he numerator of ( I Z)
determines the sign of cls" I cIS .Observc tha[ thc tirst term is nega[ive since the eyuilibrium
price decreases as S rises (direct price competition etïèct). The sign of the second term
depends on how changes in à af~tcct the demand and the s[rategic el7ècts. As explained hc(iirc
the demand ellcct incrcases in S and the strategic etlcct is more pronounced. Since lhc
stratcgic eflcct rcacts stronger on changes in ri the second term in the numerator of ( I Z) is
also negative. Flence, el.i" I dS ~ 0. 'I'his result is in sharp cuntrast to what we found liir the
simultaneous game. A comparison uf (6) and ( 12) revcals that thc impact S has on thc
stratcgic cllcct is responsihlc fiir lhis result.
Again unly marginal transportation costs are retlected in lhe cyuilihrium priccs. Cumparativc




If S?? thc indirect effect dominates the direct eticet implying tha[ thc lull cust ILnction
bccomcs stcepcr.
111,2. COOPERATIVE SOLUTION
In lhis suhsccliun, wc xludy Ihc casc whcrc lhc duopulisls littm an RKI) cartcl, i.c. coordinalc
Ihcir dccisiims amccrning yuality wilhuut sharin~ aists. In uthcr wurds, lirms agrcc cm thc
yuality hut havc scpuralc luhs. 'I hcy anticipalc thc aimpclilivc solutiun ul thc sccund stagc
~ao, a~, ~n,~
a.~ } a~,, ~,., }r
ISpricc cumpctitiun and chuusc yualily ai~ircrutivcly in ~rrclcr lu maximir.r t~ltal hmlits.r' I Icncc.
tutal ~rolits al lhc pricc cyuilibrium arc givcn by
I I,r t I 1„- P~(~~' r..c~r II) r( I' r (.~ ~..~,r l. I',r(.~ i..eu l, e i.,~r; )-('~~ i~
tP,r(.~'r..e~~)llrll'i1r'r..cn).I',:l~r.~,;)..~~..~~;1 (~~~,,~
where P~("~" r,.~",r ). Pn(.~ r,s,r ) strm Imm cyualiim (7{1. I he cuuperative eyuilihrium is
charactcrircd in Pruposition 3.
Prnnusition 3
~I~he cooperativc quality Ievel is .c' - max{ -c~ 0~ and eyuilihrium ~rices arr
l ~~.
~
l,' - I iis' .
Proot~: Maximiring (13) with reslxct to both yualitics la:ads to hvo lirst order conditions. B~
making usc of thc IaC( that a highrr yuality cannut incrcasc aggrrgate dcmand thrsc can br
wriUcn as
I clp~ dh~ ~
t- -r.~,, i-A,B:ix j .
2 cl.~' d.c
(14)
Solving liir .e' yiclds lhc solulion. I he accond derivative is always ne~,ative ensuring a
maximum. OJ~;.I).
I Icncc, lirms in an Rál) cartcl may invrsl in yuality cvrn if thcy lace an inclastic demand.
Propusition 3 cmphasiz.~s that this is unly thr r.lse if a higher yuality stren~thens hcirizontal
dittcrcnliation. Indrrd, lirst urdcr cunditions in ( 14) shu~ti that, urart from custs, tirms care
only abuul lhc inllucncc uf quality un lrwn and rival~s hriccti. Murc hririzuntnl dil7crcnlialiiin.
'~ .I~his is unc lytxx ul~ scmi-cullutiiun Iscc altiu I~cr:tihlm:m ,mrl ( r,mJnl 1 109411 nmrlhcr lypc rti cuulxrrlrnn :n Ihc
pricc sclting stagc and cum~lilion IrI Ihc yuality slagc Ihc laucr vari.ml cuulJ hc :rppruprr,uc Irn ;ural~nn.,
banking is.wcs as hanks ulicn culludc(J) in inlcresl ralcs. Ihc uplmud yualily ~cuulJ putiilivcly Jcpcnd un thc
reservation valuc v. A higherd would slimulule Ihc uplim.d yu.rlily ,ls il cnhaucc, Ihe dcmand cl7ccl
' Gyuilibrium yuality is duublcd if linns sharc R~I) cusls (Ncsc:uch Juinl Vrnlurc cnlclii.uiunl-
I (~i.e. whenS ~0, allows fur a higher rise in own price and induces a mure I~riendly respunse
Gom Ihc rival ti,lluwing an incrcasc in onc's quality .
It is straighU~urward to show [hat p' decreases in S. More interestingly,
P~ ' I'
obtain
c~ ~l -4 ~ 5. 13y cunslruclion, lhis implics lhat .~' -.r"' ca í5 --4 1 i and wc
- I 5 S 5 -4 I 5: p' ? p"' and s' ? s"'
S~-4 I 5: p," ~ p' and s"` ~ s'
Hence. if~ positive correlation sul7iciently relaxes price competition the cartcl provides a
highcr yuality and scts u highcr pricc lhan tlxx non coopcrating lirms. 'fhis result is usually
li,und in thc prescncc ol IiXcl) spilluvcrs (scc, c.g. d'Asprcmont and Jacyucmin ( I'1RX) and
Mutta (1992)). Still, the wclfare implications remain to be analyzed.
IV. REGULATF.D QUALITY DECISION AND WELFARE ANALYti1S
In this section, wc lirst undertake a simple wellàre analysis by louking al an optimal quality
standard. 'I'hen, the noncooperative and cooperative outcomes are comparcd tu thc optimal
quality standard. 'I hc lattcr is shown to be either a minimal ur a maximal yuality standard
depending on how yuality and variety interact.
IV.1. OPTIMAL QUALITY STANDARD
In this suhsection, we discuss the behavior of a regulator maximizing social welfarc hy
imposing a yuality standard .~"`. It is assumcd that the regulator docs nut tix priccs but I'aces u
break-even constraint for both lirms. 'I~hc wellare mcasure is a simplc addition of cunsumcr
and producer surplus.
'The consumcr surplus CS boils down to
17~ I - fi.~~~
('.ti'-rf.~-11 - ~l'.~)-
y
I hc lirsl tcrm is thc gruss surplus cach cunsumvr cnjuys Irum purchusing unc unit ul thr ~uud.
"I'he second cumponent measures the consumers' utility derivcd t~om the yuality s. I~he last
two terms are the price customers pay and thc avcrage transportation cost a customer incurs
whcn purchasing cithcr brand.
"I~he produccr surplus PS consisls uf twu comtxmcnts anJ ryuals
P.ti -~1 -5.~~-c(.~)' ? 0 .
The term in brackets represents the total revenucs whereas the second is thc custs ol
dcvcloping thc yuality Icvcl .~ .
Adding consumcr surplus CS and pruJuccr surplus PS gives thc lotal surplus l S
I - d.c 7~5-(;ti'tP.~-vf.c- 1- c.(.c)'
4 I
Nutice that I ti docs not raflect revenucs since these are a pure redistribution among producers
and custumcrs. n higher yuality stanJard ha~s thrn Ihrec cltècts. I-irst, it positiveh~ attècts the
indircct utility ul'thc customcr. ScconJ, it changcs thc tulal anwunt of transportatiun rusts
cuslumcrti làcc. In parlicular, it incrcascs (dccrra,xst tulal lranspurtation cusls dcprn~linp un
fi~(~)0. I hird, it increases the develupment costs c(.~)' .
I~he optimal yualily standard is givcn in I'ruposition 4.
ixPropositinn 4-
I'he optimal yuality standard s'" chosen by a regulator under a break-even constraint
4ctS' -S 4tSl is eyual to .e'" - min ~c ,~c } Yielding p'" - I-Ss'" as equilibrium
prices.
Proof: I'hc uptimal yualily standard s'"solvcs
I - ~i.5 1
nl a X rS - V t.5' - - C'(.5 )~ ( 5)
. 4
lntl(ll't tll ~~,j~ ~ () ,
The constraint itnplies that .5'"' e~0,( 4crtfi' -S)I (2c)J . Il is then casily verified that thc
brcak-cvcn con,uainl i, nut hindint; if I S 4 ~ 9. Por 1i - 4 1~1, Ihc hrcak-cvcn cunslrainl
ichitzdingiCr~(1~S)(a~i~~)~t,q. (1)rli
Clearly, the optimal yuality standard Jepends on the interaction of yuality and variety." Por an
interior solution we obtain d.5'" ~ dS ~ 0. The intuition for this is not hard to find. Thc
regulator is interested in maximizing thc utility of lhe avcrage consumcr locatcd at ~- I l4.
Indeed thc first ordcr condilion associaled with ( I S) scts lhe marginal bcnefit fix thc avcragc
consumer equal to the social marginal cosL Since the former increases in S the socially
optimal quality also does.
IV.2. COMPARISON AND QUALITY STANDARDS
ln this section, we compare the yuality levels associated with the noncooperative and
cooperative sccnarios investigated above with the op[imal quality standard. We restrict
attention to the unconstrained .,.'" ." figure I depicts the four dilferent yuality levels as a
function of fi .
"Notice that imposing a minimum quality standard'at stage zeró under the cos[ conditions given in Propositions
1 and 2 does not necessarily imply that .c"" is [he firm's equilibrium choice. If this is the case s"" should be
interpreted as the Icvel of yuality lirms arc lixced to provide. Indecd, the yuestion ul' how a minimum quality
standard may perturb a symmetric cyuilihrium in yualitics rcmains an intcresting one Icft for tLtmt rescarch. Sce
for asymmetric cquilibria [hc studics by Runncn ( 1991), Crampcs and I lollandcr ( I~)95).
" l'he maín yualit.uivc resuhs arc cunlirmed whcn working with 1he constrained .5''" .
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'I~he yuality Icvcl is presented un thc vcrtical axis and rl' un thc horizontal axis. Recall that the
noncoopcrativc scyucntial and simultaneous equilibrium yuality intersect vt~here the strategic
cftèct cyuuls zcro, i.c. at í~ --I I 2, and thal .c" -.e' whcn S--4 I 5. Proposition 5 summarizes
the comparison of yuality levels.
Pronosition 5:
I hc ranking of thc uptimal yualily standarJ, thc cuupcrativc, and noncuopcrativc
yuality Ievcls depends on thc nature uf intrractiun in the tiilluwing way.
If S ?0, Ihcn .c„ ~.~." ~.~,~ ~.c' .
II'rl ~ U, thcn
~ q i ~ ~-~; .- u
~ r~ - - . ... 1 ~. I -.
.~ -s~ ~ ' il - a . i . ii ~. -- i 3.
?IILet us first deal with .," and.r'`. Under negative (positive) correlation the simultaneous
noncooperative equilibrium quality level turns out to be hibher ( lower) than the socially
optimal one. "I'he reason is that thc marginal bcnetit of a higher quality accruing to the
marginal consumer exceeds ( tàlls short ot) the onc for the average consumer when S~(~)0.
Hence, hrms havc an cxccssive ( insul"licicnt) incentive to providc quality. fhcrcforc, a
minimum (maximum) quality standard is called for in case of positive (negative) corrclation.
In what fbllows, we compare the difTerent sequential outcomes to .,'". 'fhe most clcar-cut
results of thís comparison are obtained for the case of negative corcelation. Private incentives
lead to socially insufticient quality levels and the gap between .," and s"'' grows the higher
S. Buth tindings are línked to the presence of strategic et7ècls. Clearly, one expects .," ~.," if
the strategic eflèct is negative. In addition, from equa[ion ( 12) we know that changes in thc
strategic eftècl duminatc chan~,es in the demand eflèct as S increascs. Ilence. whereas thc
social incentives to provide quality increase in S the privale incentives lall.
The qualitative results are unchanged when correlation is not too posilive. More precisely,
s" ?.,"" as long as 0 ~S .-4 I 5.~I~hc intuition comcs in two steps. l~irst, if 0 ~fi ~, I l2 , wc
havc .,"' -.," ?.v'". "I~hat is bccausc the averagc consumcr's marginal benefil of quality
exceeds the one of the marginal consumer if S~ o, and the strategic ef"fect is still negative.
Second, if -I ~ 2~S ~-4 ~ 5 the strate~ic effect becomes positive but private incentives fall
short of social incentives in spite of the overinvestment effect. Finally, if -4 ~ 5 ~S ?- I the
overimestment cffect becomes so strong that .e"' ?.,'"' ?.," .
The Rca.D cartel ducs not provide yualily unless lhis relaxes price competition which reyuires
S ~ 0. Observc Iwwcvur, that .c` is determined by pricc el~tècts only and lhat the LHS of (14)
is more sensitive to changes in S than the revenue part in ( I I). Accordingly, .v' grows fastcr
than .c"' when S falls.'fhc sum of both pricc effects in (14) is equal to the marginal benctit
aceruing to the average consumer iff S--4 I 5, hence .r` ?.c"' ?., " if -4 I 5?S?- I.
21Observe that not all consumers are necessarily better off under a minimum quality standard. In
fact, usin~ ( I) it is easily seen that lix all unregulated equilibria j- si,.tic,~ we have
V,,~~-t"?Ot~(.e,"-c')~ItStS~~?Ofor:sl~2.
where the tcrm in brackcts mcasures the marginal Ixnetit oFa yuality impruvement accruing
to a consumer locatcd at z. Accordingly, some consumers are worse ot'f under a minimum
yuality standard il~ -4 ~ 5 ~ b~-2 ~ 3. All cunsumcrs arc worsc oll~ undcr a maximum yuality
standard when S ? 0.
V. UISCUSSION ANU CONCLUSIONti
Real world observations show that product attributes are of'ten dependent. In spite uf this, the
existing literature on product differentiation has not yet integrated this phenomenon iiuo the
study of (irms' product ptacement decisions. "1'his paper is a tirst attempt to till this gap by
considering a situalion whcrc thc yuality offcrcd by a lirm inllucncrs thc uansportation costs
associated with horizontal product dittcrentiation.
We approach thc problem by incorporating attribute dependence into the consumers' indirect
utilily limcliun. tiomc consumcrs hcnclit morc lhan ulhcrs f~rum a yu;~lity improvrmcnt
dcpending on thcir tastes liir a hurirontal product characteristic, and the fonn of interaction
between yuality and variety. When interaction is negative (positive) the marginal consumer
benefits more (less) from a higher yuality than the inti-amar~inal consumers. Although this
modelization is specific, we have argucd that it yields demand timctions with very intuitive
propertics. Alternatively, one could havc introduced an c~plicit t~chnological cons[raint ott the
supply side. Wc havc studied this case and Ibund the main qualitative results of the model of
this paper conlinncd.
Our analysis assumes that all yuality dependent costs are tixed costs incurred at the lirs[ stage
of the gamc. I'his cnables us to dctcrminc how yualily improvcmcnts influcnce pricc
s
~~competition depending un the tiirm of interaction. C'learly, variable costs can be yuality
dependent implying profits ofthe fiirm
Il,~li,.p~.s,..e~)-~P, -c,(~',)~U,Ip,.p~..c,..~~). i-.1.lf, ix j
We have studied this seenario by specilying c, (.~, )- c.~, ~ I 2. 'I~he rosulls arc even mure clcur
cut: all comparotivc stalics maintain their sign and everything switches at fi-0, that is
~~,~~.~~"~.e"~ ifh?O,and.r,~ ~s,w~.r„ ifS~O.
This brings us buck to our main lindings and lhcir pulicy implications. Wcllare losscs arc duc
to two liirces and their dependcncc on the naturc ul interaction lxtween yuality and varicty.
First, there is the dif7èrence bclwecn the benefit uf a marginal yuality improvemenl accruinp,
to the marginal and tu lhe avcragc consumer (see, c.g., Spcnce (1975)). 'I~his is thc driving
force behind uur results when thc gamc is simultaneous Ncgativc (positivc) corrclation
strengthens !he private inccntive~ lo ovcrprovidc yuality since the murginal consumer ~ains
more (Iess) Irom a yuality improvcment than undcr indcpendence. Accordingly, a minimum
yuality stand:u~I is callcd liir whcn currclaliun is positivr and a maximum yuality slandard
undcr ncgativr currrlatiun.
The second ti~rce is strategic, thus plays a role only when the game is seyucntial. Negativc
(positive) correlation renders price competition along thc horiwntal characteristic fiercer
(more relaxed), thus strengthcning (Icssening) the importance of strategic considerations fix
the tirms' yuality choice. As a result the privatc incentives [o provide yualíty becomc
insul7icicnt undcr ncgativc corrclation. A minimum yuality standard is thcn dcsirablc. Nuticc
however that lhc presence of a negative slratep,ic cf7èct ís suf7icicnl but nut neccssary to
generate inadcyuate private incentivcs. Ilowcver, if correlation is strongly positivc privatc
incentives to provide yuality hecome again escessive rclative to the social optimum. A
maximum yualily slandard is thcn wcllàrc impruving.
~~ni'~'t~:NUtx
PruojoJ7'ra~io.riliun !:
We proceed as tiillows. ~irst, we solve lor the simultaneous symmetric eyuilibrium in prices
and yualities and give the condítion under which protit functions reach a local maximum at
lhis cyuilibrium. ticcond, wc lin~ Ihc most prolitablc dcviatiun I~om this cyuilihrium and
dctermine a condiliun on c such lhat this deviation becumes unprufitable. We deal explicitly
with firm A. By symmctry, thc same results hold tbr tirm B.
i) Explicitly, thc tint ordcr conditions ofcyuations (3) and (4) ti~r tirm A arc
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24ii) We show that firm A cannot increase its profit by choosing .r,, s .r", pA ~ p" given that
.r„ -.e", p„ -~i" . Observe that t~'fl , I r7.e; ? 0, hence í~~F,, I c7s, is convex. If thc second
dcrivativc is ncgativc whcn cvaluatcd at .~ ,-.~" , a protitablc dcviation may only arisc I~r
.c" ~.~ ,.'I wo cascs rnust tx distinguisheJ.
I. Let S~ 0. 'fwo subcases have to bc considered depending on whether the optimal deviation
lies on the bound given by D,, - I, or on the uppcr bound of the strategy space, i.e., .C - 1 I S.
a) Assume that .~ , lies on the boundary defined by Dn~p,,.e,,,.v„ -.e", p„ - p" ~- L F~rom the
latter we obtain the optimal deviation price as ~,~.t ,~- (1 f S)(.~ ,-.i" ). Hence deviation
protits if' 1),, 5 I arc
~,r(Iti(.~r)„~ -~„ ~ - ~ c.
u-. ,Irr I~~)-(1tS)(.~'n-.~„)-2.c',.
Maximiring wíth respect to .~ , Yicldsa uniquc maximum at .;, -(I t~i)Ic.~~~
Evaluatc hI , at .; ,. One cun lhcn show that
I S(2(1 t 13S ) f1,(p„.r.')-FI,-O ifc~-'c,--t
4 IG
Observe that the above condition is only valid if .;A-( I t S )I c s s - I I S. '('he case where this
does not hold is considered next.
b) Assume that ( I t S ) I c~.~ - I I S. Then wc neccssarily have .i ,- I I S .'I~he
highest dcviation protit as a ILnction of p, is pivcn by
(2(1 -n.~„)-~i,, -.i„ t I lS) r
I I.r (P.i,.èn - I I 5,.~'rt -~". hir -
P,, ):- Pn --
(1 -Ss„) 2S'
Maximizing I7, w.r.L p, subject to D, - I yields
~,~-(ItS)(tis-,,,) .
'~~ Intuitivrly mar~,inal costs ofa yuality improvcmcnt mutit bc cyual to thc marginal bcncfit ut it accruin~ to the
margin:d cunsuncr IrK:ncJ al - I.
25i;valuate fl ~ at ji, . Onc can thcn show that
n e fl ~0 ifc~c -3~(~}b) n(P., „)- .~ - ~ -
~
2. Let ~i .-0. 'ihe strategy space constraint is no longer binding such that thc reasoning and
the results of Ia) upply.
The comparison of the cost conditions show:ti that ~.~ ~,. I Icncr the symmetric simultaneous
eyuilibrium exists if c? max{c,,c, ~. QGD
Proofu~ Prupo.ciliun 2:
We proceed as tiillows. I~irsl, we solvc lix the symmctric cyuilibrium in quality and develop a
condition on costs such that the profit functions attain a maximum at this equilibrium. Second.
we show that under the condition un c there is nu prolitahle dcviation in tlte strategy space.
We dcal explicidy with lirm A. 13y symmetry, the same results hold for lirm l3.
i) Firm A's prolit at thc price eyuilibrium is of thc lirrm
n:f(~Yn,.CU)-~~a(.1':~.Snt~~.t (~~a~~~~.~,.Yrt~,hef.c,..e„).s,..,R)-( (5,).
Deriving with respect to ., , yiclds lhe lollowing tint order condition
(3t.c,(I -S)-.,'e(I t2S))(4-c~(.,', t3.,'~r t I)tS'.e,)
9 ~-fi
-c.e~.
(.. (.~~~ t .c~~ ))'
(AI)
k:valuation at thc symmctric cyuilibrium yiclds ,," - max~ a~i Uf I hr sccund urdcr
~ I'~
sufticicnt condition rcyuires that
~~'n,, z~cix~}~,'-ak;-z~ ~) -~o.
~~.,~... 3( i z~ t~tij~~ - a q IA~
2c,It is straighUiirward to show that cunditiun (A2) is satistied if
I ~l(8-2i)
~ . ~i - t
~~ I8
ii) We shuw that tinn A cannul incrcasc ils prolit by choosing .,, x.," givcn that .,,, -,c
The argwnent hinges on the sign of lhe third derivative uf protits which is given by
r~`fl, ?b(I-b'.,n)~IZfil)t
~ , r~.e, 3(2-iti(.e, t,,~u))
(n3)
Hence, .ci~n~r"3'fl , 18.e~ J-.,i~;n~fi ~ and two cases have to bc considered:
l. Let eS ~ 0.'fhc third dcrivative is pusitive implying that the tirst derivative is convex in .,,.
Sincc the sccond dcrivativc is ncgativc when cvaluated at s,-., "' wc know that the most
prutitable dev ialiun must arisc liir .~ ,.," .'I wu sutxascs can arisc. 'I'he distinctiun stems
I~om thc làct that thr dcvialiuns a1 S, I I~~ can eilhcr lic within Ihc .c, - inlcrval li~r which
the middle piccc uf U, givrn in ( IO) applies ur outside uf it. fhis distinction depends un ~~ .
Evaluation of'the middle piece of D,, at s, - I I~1 and s„ -.c"" gives
U,(.c., - I IS.sx -s")- 2b t I J' I ifS ~ I
3S 1?I ifO~:S-sl.
Accordingly, twu subcascs arisc.
a) Let ó- I. Wc havc tu shuw that
n,(,"..,"~- ti,(;,-tis,.,,,.~, o
by using thc middle piece of( 10). 'I he ah,rve is satislird if
? c~(20-,1)
~'' -c, --t ~ci.
9 36
I Icncc, liir ~5 - I Ihe symmrtric cyuilibrium cxists if ~~i:,.
b) L,et 0~b ? I.'fhc price eyuilibrium associated wilh the tirst demand picce in ( It)) is p,ivcn
bY Pk - 0, P, - s,( I t ~l) -.," - I, whcrc p;, is lhc highcst pricc allowing (irm A tu attract thc
entire demand. Accordingly, the deviution protil is
Il,(,,..v")-[,'n(Itb)-,~.,.. -I]I-cs~ ~2
~~which has an interior solution S,, -1 I t S) ~ c ~ I I b' .One can then show that
II,(~.,,..r„)- fl~~~'.~-lltS)~c..e„~~ 0
ir
4 ~l'(~5? t I ~3~1)
I
~~ ,It~
If S, - I I fi ~(I t fi) ~ c then one obtains a corner sol ution and we have tu show that
~ w",.,.,.1 - n,~c, - I i~..,,, l- u.
I~hc latlcr is satislircl il
~i(20 - I1~1)
~''c~.i - - -.
12
I lencc, liir ~l' ~ o Ihu symmrtric suhgamr prrlccl rcluilihrium czists il ~
2. Let I-- ~~ - 0. I'hc third dcrivativc givcn in (A3) fxc,imcs ncgativc implying that thr tirst
derivalivc is concavc liir non-ncgative .,,,. Supposc thc sccond derivative oF the protit
f~unetion w.r.L .c , is negative al .,:, -.c" , i.e., c- i,. I~hcn we know that the most prohtable
deviation arises at S,- 0 ~.,'"' . ConscyuenlJy, wc have to show lhat
I1,~.,„ c„ ~ Il,~à, 11..,,~ ~ It.
'I'he la[ter holds if
c~?cs-max(0,9t~(272 b)~?c,.
I~ence, ti~r -I -b ~- 0 the symmetric subglame perlèct equilibrium cxists if c?c,. Adding i)
and ii) cumplctes Ihr pro~il.
~KRF,FF,ItI?N('I~:S
d'Asprcmont, C. and A. Jacyucmin (1988), Cooperative and non-cooperative RBcD in duopoly
with spilluvcrs, :lmcricun licunumic KrvicN 7R, I I33-1 I37.
Anderson, S., A. dr Palma and .L-I~. 'I'hisse (1992), Di.ccrrte ('huice "!'hrury u( Pruducl
Ui~Jcrentiuliun, ( MI"I~ Nress C'ambridgc).
Bouckaert, J. and IL Degryse (1995), Phonebanking, Euronrun Economic Review 39, ?39-
244.
Canoy, M. and M. i'eitc (1995), 'fhe Dií'terentiation "I riangle, Unïver.,ity uJ [3onn Di.cru,.,iun
Puper A-478, 37 pp.
Crampcs, C. and A. flollandcr (1995), Duopoly and (luality Standards, Europcun Econonric
Revirw 39. 71-82.
Degryse, H. (1996), On thc Interaction between vcrtical and horizontal product diffcrentiation:
an application tu banking, Journu! nf Indus7riu! F,ronomic.,, 169-18G.
Dos Santos I~crrcira, R. and .L-I~. 'I hissc (1996), I lurizunlal and Vertical Dil~lcrcntiation: 'I'hc
I.:mnhardl Mi,drl, (ntrrnatinnrd.h,urncr( nJ7nchr.ctriu( Ur,~unizuliun 14, 4R5-5p6.
D'souza, G. and K. Rau ( 1995), ('an Kcpeatinp, an Advcrtiscment Mure Prcyuently than thc
Competition Aflect Brand pretcrenec in a Mature Market'?, Jnurnu! uJ Murkrlin,~ 59,
32-42
Economides, N. (1989), (luality variations and maximal variety diflcrentiation, Re);iunul
.Science unel (Irhun Gcunurnic.c 19, 21-29.
29I~ershtman, C'. and N. Gandal ( 1994), Uisadvantagcous Semicollusion, Inler-nuNuncrl Jnru-nul
uJ Indu.~lricd Or);crni-uliun 12, 141-154.
I~udcntnrg, D. and J. 'I irulc ( 19R4), fhc làl-cal cl lccl, Ihc puppy-rlri~ pluy, and Ihc Ican and
hungry look, Amerircrn F.crrnumic Rei.ieti. !'upevu unc! 1'rr,cc~edins;.c 74, 361-368.
liotelling, IL (1929), Stability in ('ompctition. Licunumic.luru-nul i9, 41-i7.
Matutes, ('. and n..l. Padilla (1994), tiharcd A I~M Nrtworks and Qanking Compctition.
latrohean Is~.unomic Rerirw 18. I I 1;-I 138.
Motta, M. (1992), Cooperative RBcD and vertical pruduct dil7èrentiation. Inlernuliuncrl
Juurncd uJ lnchr.~h-iul Or~uni-uliun 10, 643-661.
Mussa, M. ~uid ti. Roscn ( 197R), Munupuly and I'ruduct (luality. JuurnulnJ l:runumic Throrr
18, 3(11-317.
Ronnen, ll. (1991), Minimum quality standards, tixed costs, and competition, RcuiclJuurna! oJ
Ecunomic.c 22, 490-504.
Schulz, N. and K. Stahl (1994), Advertising (Innovation) and Product Differentiation,
Univer.ci([i! uJ Mcrnnheim, l~i.ccre~.~~iun I'eq,er No 493 ~)4, 22 pp.
Spence, M. ( 1975), Monopoly, Ouality, and Regulation, l3r!! .lutn-ner! uf Ecunomics 6. -t17-
429.
Sutton, J. (1991 ), ~S'rmk ('u.rl.c cuacl Murkr(.S'N-uchrrr, (Ml~f Press, ('ambridgc).
Tirolc, J. (1988), "I'hc Thcury ujlnclu.c(ricrl (h-};uni:uliun, (MI"1 Press. Cambridgel.
Von Ungern-Sternbcrg, '1. (19R8), Monopolistic C'ompetitiun and General Purpose Pruducts.
ReviewirjL~nnornic.S'luelir.c 55, 231-246.
;ONo. Author(s)
9G46 1.P. Ziliak and T.1. Knicsncr
9G47 P.M. Kort
9G48 M.P. Bcrg
9G49 H. Uhlig and Y. Xu
9G50 M. Slikker and
A. van dcn Nouweland
9651 H.L.F. de Groot
9G5z R.M. dc long and J. Davidson
9G53 1. Suijs, A. Dc Wacgcnaerc
and P. Borm
Title
Thc Imporlance of Sample Altrition in Lifc Cycle Labor
Supply Estimation
Optimal RBtD Invcsuncnts oflhc Firm
Pcrformancc Comparisons for Mainlaincd Itcros
Effort and thc Cyclc: Cyclical Implications of Efficicncy Wagcs
Communication Situations wilh a Hierarchical Playcr
Partition
Thc Struggle for Rents in a Schumpctcrian Economy
Consislcncy of Kcmcl Estimalors of hclcrosccdaslic and
Autocorrclalcd Covariancc Matriccs
Stochaslic Coopcralivc Gamcs in Insurancc and Rcinsurancc
9G54 A.N. Bancrjcc and J.R. Magnus Testing thc Scnsitivity of OLS whcn thc Variancc Matri~ is
(Partially) Unknown
9G55 A. Kalwij
9GSG M. Lind and F. van Mcgen
9G57 A. van Socst, P. Fontcin
and Rob Euwals
9658 C. Femández and M.F.J. Steel
9G59 R. Sarin and P. Wakkcr
96G0 J.R. Magnus and J. Durbin




9GG5 C. Fcmándcz, J. Osicwalski
and M F.1. Stccl
Estimating thc Economic Rctum lo Schooling on lhc basis of
Pancl Dala
Ordcr Bascd Cost Allocation Rulcs
Eamings Capacity and Labour Markct Participalion
On Bayesian Modelling ofFat Tails and Skewncss
Revcalcd Likclihood and Knightian Unccrtainly
A Classical Problcm in Lincar Regression or How to Estimale
lhe Mean of a Univariate Norrnal Distribution with Known
Variancc
An Expcrimcnt on Risk Takmg and Evalualion Pcriods
NonparameUic Nonlincar Co-Trcnding Analysis, wilh an
Applicalion to Intcrest and InOation in thc U.S.
Oplimization of Periodic Polling Syslcros wilh Non-Precmptivc,
Time-Limi[ed Service
A Root-N Consistcnt Scmiparamctric Estimator for Fi~cd Effcet
Binary Rcsponsc Pancl Data
Robust Bayesian Infcrcncc on Scalc ParamctcrsNo. Author(s)
9GCiG X. Han and H. Wcbcrs
9GG7 R. Kollmann
9G68 R.C.H. Chcng and
J.P.C. Klcijncn




9G72 Y.H. Farzin, K.J.M. Huisman
and P.M. Kort
9G73 1.R. Magnus and
F.J.G.M. Klaasscn
9G74 J. Fidrmuc
9G75 M. Das and A. van Socst
9G7G A.M. Lejour and
H.A.A. Vcrbon
9677 B. van Aarlc and
S.-E. Hougaard Jcnscn
9G7R Th.E. Nijman, F.A. dc Roon
and C.Vcld
Title
A Commcnt on Shakcd and Sutton~s Modcl of Vcrtical Product
Diffcrcntiation
The Exchange Rate in a Dynamic-Optimizing Cun-ent Account
Modcl with Nominal Rigiditics: A Quantitativc [nvcstigation
Improvcd Dcsign of Qucucing Simulation Ezpcrimcnts with
Highly Hcterosccdastic Rcsponscs
Economic Effects of Electronic Markets
The Effcet ofMonctarv Policy on E~change Ratcs: How to Soh.e
lhc Purzles
On the First Entrance Timc Distribution of thc M)Dh Queue: a
Combinatorial Approach
Oplimal Timing of Tcchnology Adoption
Testing Some Common Tennis Hypotheses: Four Years at
Wimblcdon
Political Sustainability of Economic Rcforms: D~namics and
Analysis of Rcgional Economic Factors
A Pancl Data Modcl lór Subjcctivc lnfomiation on Houschold
Incomc Cirowth
Fiscal Policies and Endogenous Growlh in Intcgrated Capital
Markcls
Oulput Slabiliiation in EMU Is Thcrc a Casc for an EFTS?
Pricing Tcrm Slruclurc Risk in Futures Markcts
9G79 M. Dufwcnbcrg and U. Gncery Efficicncy, Rceiprocity, and Expcctations in an Espcrimental
Gamc
9G80 P. Bolton and
E.-L. von Thaddcn
9G81 T. tcn Raa and P. Mohncn
9GR2 S. Hochgucrtcl mid
van Socsl
'IGR3 F.A de Roon, Th.E. Nijman
and B.J.M. Wcrkcr
Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporalc Control
Thc Location of Comparativc Advantagcs on thc Basis of
Fundamcntals only
Thc Rcladon bclwccn Financial and Housing Wcahh of Dutch A,
Houscholds
Tcsling for Spanning with Fulures Contracts and Nontradcd
Asscls: A Gcncral ApproachNo. Author(s)
9G84 F.Y. Kumah
9G85 U.Gnoe .ry and M. Das
9G8G B. von Stcngcl,
A. van den Elzen and
D. Talman




9689 T. ten Raa and E.N. Wolff
9G90 J. Suijs
9691 C. Scidl and S.Traub






9G9G L. Ljungqvist and H. Uhlig
9697 A. Rustichini
9G98 G.Gurkan and A.Y. Ozgc
9G99 H. Huizinga
9G100 H. Huizinga
9G 101 H. Nordc, F. Palronc and
S. Tijs
9G102 M. Bcrg, A. Dc Wacgenacrc
and J. Wiclhouwcr
9G 103 G. van dcr Laan, D. Talman
and Z. Yang
Title
Common Stochastic Trends in the Current Account
E~perimcntal Investigation of Pereeivod Risk in Finite Random
Walk Proccsscs
Tracing Equilibria in Exlcnsivc Gamcs by Complcmcntary
Pivoting
Gcncral Aggrcgation of Dcmand and Cost Sharing Melhods
Short-Term and Long-Tcrm Govcmmcnt Debt and
Nonresident Intcrest Withholding Taxcs
Outsourcing of Scrvices and lhe Productivity Rceovery in U.S.
Manufacturing in the 1980s
A Nucleolus for Stochastic Cooperalivc Gamcs
Rational Choicc and thc Rclcvancc of Irrclcvant Altcmalivcs
Testing Decision Rules for Multiatlribulc Decision Making
In(lation Targcts and Contracts with Unccrtain Ccntral
Banl:cr Prcfcrcnccs
Equilibria and Approximate Equilibria in In[initc Potential
Games
A Two-Supplicr Inventory Model
Catching up wilh thc Kcyncsians
Dynamic Programming Solution of hicentivc Constraincd
Problems
Sample-Path Optimization of Buffcr Allocations in a Tandcm
Qucuc - Parl I: Thcorclical Issucs
Thc Dual Rolc of Moncy and Optimal Financial Taxcs
The Taxation Implicit in Two-Ticrcd Exchange Ralc Systems
Charactcrir.ing Propcrtics ofApproximalc Solutions for
Optimization Problcros
Oplimal Tax Rcduction by Dcprecialion: A Stochastic Modcl
Existencc and Approximation of Robust Stationary Points on
PolytopcsNo. Author(s)
')6104 li. Huii.inga and S.B Niclscn
96105 H. Degryse
9G 106 H. Huizinga and S.B. Nielsen
9G 107 T. Dicekmann
9G 108 F. dc Jong and
M.W.M. Dondcrs
9G109 F. Vcrbovcn
961 10 D. Granot, H. Hamers
and S. Tijs
9G1 I I P. Aghion, P. Bolton and
S. Fries
9G1 l2 A. Dc Wacgcnacrc, R. Kast
and A. Lapicd
9G1 13 R. van dcn Brink and
P.H.M. Ruys
9G114 F. Palomino




9702 H.G. Blocmcn and
E.G.F. Slancanclli
9703 P.J.1. Hcrings and
V.1. Vannctclbosch
9704 F. dc 1ong, F.C. Drost
and B.J.M. Wcrkcr
9705 C. Fcmándcz and M.F 1. Slccl
970G M.A. Cldijk, P.J. Zwancvcld,
1.S. Hooghicrostra, L.G. Kroon
and M. Salomon
Title
Thc Coordinauon of ('apnal Incumc and Profit Ta~aliun wnh
Cross-Owncrship of Firms
The Total Cost of Trading Belgian Shares: Brusscls Versus
London
The Political Economy of Capital Income and Profit Tasation in
a Small Open Economy
Thc Evolution of Comcntions with Endogcnous Interactions
Inlraday Lcad-Lag Rclationships Bctwcen thc Fulures-,
Oplions and Slock Markct
Brand Rivalry, Markct Scgmcntalion, and thc Pricing of
Optional Enginc Powcr on Aulomobilcs
Wcakly Cyclic Graphs and Delivery Games
Financial Rcslructuring in Trmisilion Economics
Non-linear Asset Valua[ion on Markets with Frictions
Thc Intcmal Organization ofthc Firm and its Extcmal
Environmcnt
Conflicting Trading Objcetivcs and Markct Efficicnc}
Endogenous Stackelberg Lcadership
Busincss Cyclcs in a Two-Scetor Modcl of Endogcnous Growth
Collusion and Hicrarchy in Banking
Individual Wcallh, Rcscrvatiat Wagcs and Transitions into
Employmcnt
Rcfincmcnts of Rationalirabilih~ for Nomial-Form Gamcs
Ecchangc Ratc Target Zoncs: A Ncw Approach
On thc Dangcrs ofModclling Through Continuous Distributions:
A Baycsian Pcrspcclivc
Dccision Support Systcros Hclp Railncd to Scarch for'Win-
Win' Solutions in Railway Nctwork DcsignNo. Author(s) '1'iUc
9707 G. Bekaert, R.J. Hodrick and The Implications ofFirst-Ordcr Risk Avcrsion for Asset
D.A. Marshall Marl:ct Risk Prcmiums
970R C. Fcrnándcz and M.F.J. Stccl Muhivarialc Studcnl-r Rcgression Modcls, Pitfalls and Infcrcncc
9709 H. Huizinga and S.B. Nielscn Privati~ation, Public Invcstmcnt, and Capital Incomc TaxaUOn
9710 S. Eijffinger, E. Schaling and Central Bank Independence: a Sensitivity Analysis
M. Hocbcrichts
9711 H. Uhlig Capital lncomc Taxalion and thc Suslainability of Pcrmancnl
Primary Dcficits
9712 M. Dufwenbcrg and W. Guth Indirect Evolulion Versus Slrategic Delegation: A Comparison
ofTwo Approachcs lo Explaining Economic Inslilulions
9713 H. Uhfig Long Tcrm Dcbl and the Polilical Support for a Monctary Union
9714 E. Charlier, B. Melenberg and An Analysis of Housing Expcnditurc Using Semiparamctric
A. van Socst Modcls and Panel Data
9715 E. Charlicr, B. Mclcnbcrg and An Analysis of Housing ExpcndiWrc Using Scmiparamctric
A.van Socst Cross-Scclion Modcls
971G 1.P Choi and S.-S. Yi Vcrtical Forcclosurc wilh thc Choicc uf Input Sl~ificatlons
9717 J.P. Choi Patcnt Liligation as an Infonnation Transmission Mcchanism
9718 H.Degryse and A. Irmen Attribute Dcpcndence and thc Provision ofQualityïi~~ï~m~~inn~~iiii